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ABSTRACT
PROACTIVE EXTRACTION OF IOT DEVICE CAPABILITIES FOR SECURITY
APPLICATIONS
Internet of Things (IoT) device adoption is on the rise. Such devices are mostly self-operated
and require minimum user interventions. This is achieved by abstracting away their design com-
plexities and functionalities from users. However, this abstraction significantly limits a user’s
insights on evaluating the true capabilities (i.e., what actions a device can perform) of a device and
hence, its potential security and privacy threats. Most existing works evaluate the security of those
devices by analyzing the environment data (e.g., network traffic, sensor data, etc.). However, such
approaches entail collecting data from encrypted traffic, relying on the quality of the collected data
for their accuracy, and facing difficulties in preserving both utility and privacy of the data.
We overcome the above-mentioned challenges and propose a proactive approach to extract IoT
device capabilities from their informational specifications to verify their potential threats, even
before a device is installed. More specifically, we first introduce a model for device capabilities in
the context of IoT. Second, we devise a technique to parse the vendor-provided materials of IoT
devices and enumerate device capabilities from them. Finally, we apply the obtained capability
model and extraction technique in a proactive access control model to demonstrate the applicability
of our proposed solution. We evaluate our capability extraction approach in terms of its efficiency
and enumeration accuracy on devices from three different vendors.
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The popularity of IoT devices is gaining momentum, with projections of 75.44 billion devices
worldwide by 2025 [1]. This large ecosystem is comprised of a variety of devices that are being
used in diverse environments including healthcare, industrial control and automation, and smart
homes. Manufacturers place emphasis on certain features or characteristics of IoT devices and
often abstract away their actual design complexity and functionalities from the user. Many IoT
devices are equipped with sensors and actuators beyond those required for their primary function-
alities. For example, the Nest Protect [2], a smart smoke and carbon monoxide detector with an
array of smoke and steam sensors as well as a microphone is able to perform far more than just
smoke detection.
1.1 Motivation
These abstractions and extended (and in many cases hidden) functionalities of an IoT device
result in a blind spot for consumers and leave an IoT ecosystem vulnerable to various security and
privacy threats. Installing the previously mentioned smoke detector necessitates that the consumer
understands its potential security and privacy consequences, especially considering the different
locations that a smoke detector may be placed within a home setting. This requires the consumer
to study the device’s design specifications to find out what transducers it possess. Furthermore, she
must have the insights to realize the security and privacy consequences of having a microphone that
may be able to arbitrarily capture sound within the device’s environment, and determine if any of
those consequences violate the security policies of the household or organization. Performing all
these steps is infeasible for most IoT users due to either their time constraints or lack of knowledge.
Therefore, IoT consumers need assistance to properly interpret the underlying security and privacy
threats from these devices. Our work aims to fill this gap by providing consumers information
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on IoT device capabilities and introducing ways that this information can be leveraged for the
purposes of user-defined access control.
A comprehensive knowledge of device capabilities can be used in various security applications,
including security verification, monitoring, risk analysis, and digital forensics. One example ap-
plication is proactively verifying the security and privacy of IoT devices in a smart home or in an
organization. Specifically, once the capabilities of a device are known, assertions can be made on
whether or not those capabilities violate any of the security and privacy policies in an organization
or a household. We can also ensure that the deployment of an IoT device in some location or
under some configuration does not cause any security or privacy violations and can take adaptive
measures to mitigate that risk.
While many other consumer goods and services are subject to large amounts of scrutiny when
being considered for purchase, the same is not always true for IoT devices. Consumers are not
expected to thoroughly understand the technologies that go into smart devices beyond the features
as they are advertised. Despite the casual acceptance of smart devices and the abstractions of
their inner workings, consumers often keep devices in deeply personal locations or interact with
them in personal ways. The devices in these scenarios therefore come with security and privacy
considerations that consumers should be aware of when using them, if not when purchasing them.
For example, the Nest Protect smoke alarm system provides users with the ability to receive
notifications about potentially dangerous situations in their home. However, this device has an
onboard microphone and is therefore capable of detecting (and recording) audio, which users may
find concerning, depending on the physical location of that device in the home. However, the
microphone is not advertised directly as part of any feature of the device, and is only listed within
technical specification documentation for the device. An additional possibility is for a consumer to
purchase this particular device for its primary features without being aware of the extended features
of the device, including the potential for it to record sound.
Security goals and resulting policies often come more naturally to consumers than one might
initially believe. Context of what a device is actually doing is important to these security goals,
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especially when put into simple terms that are intuitive for consumers to consider. He et al. conduct
a survey in [3] to explore how users perceive different actions of IoT devices under access control
circumstances related to social relationships, device location, and more. Device capabilities in
this survey are not described in terms of actual device instances or particular manufacturers, but
rather as abstract actions that could apply to many different devices. For example, “live video,”
“play music,” and “camera on/off” are all capabilities described in the survey [3]. When these
capabilities are posed to participants in conjunction with environmental attributes such as device
location or the user who invokes the capability, participants present clear indications of security
goals, such as the fact that device location is highly influential in access control decisions related
to a device that performs live video.
The results of this survey are a clear indication that, when consumers are faced with device
capabilities in plain terms, they can (and may even be more motivated to) make informed deci-
sions about which device actions should be performed, who they should be performed by, and in
what circumstances (based on social relationships, physical device location, etc.) they should be
performed. In this way, knowledge and a clear understanding of device capabilities can empower
users to make the security and privacy decisions that are best suited for their IoT ecosystem.
1.2 Problem Statement
This thesis primarily addresses the question of how to represent, extract, and leverage device
capabilities for the ultimate benefit of user security and mitigation of privacy concerns. We aim
to do so proactively, such that our proposed method could be used to garner insights about an IoT
device and verify that it conforms to user-defined security policies even before it is installed in its
environment. To this end, this thesis investigates the following questions:
• How can IoT device capabilities be defined and represented generically, across devices?
• How can such IoT device capabilities be extracted automatically from vendor-provided doc-

















Figure 1.1: An overview of our methodology, including 1) development of the model, 2) pre-processing of
vendor materials, and 3) applying an ontology to extracted specifications by way of an automatic enumera-
tion function.
• How can these extracted capabilities be leveraged to verify the safety and security of an IoT
device, relative to its environment?
1.3 Overview of Approach
Figure 1.1 illustrates an overview of our approach to extract the capabilities of a smart home
device from its specifications. The three steps are described below, and we provide examples of
various Google Nest products including the Nest Protect and Nest Cam Indoor [2, 4] throughout.
• Step 1: Defining Capability Model for IoT Devices We first define IoT devices, then define
their transducers (i.e., sensors and actuators), and finally define the capability models that
map transducers to their set of capabilities. (See Chapter 3).
• Step 2: Normalizing Vendor Materials for Extraction We first extract the device specifi-
cations from various vendor materials, then prune the extracted data to eliminate irrelevant
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contents (e.g., stop words and site navigation links), and finally normalize the pruned con-
tents to refer to the transducer information. (See Section 4.1).
• Step 3: Building IoT Device Capabilities We first build an ontology of the device specifi-
cations (see Section 4.2), then derive an enumeration of transducers for a device by applying
this ontology on the processed vendor materials, and finally map these transducers to their
capabilities. (See Section 4.3).
1.4 Contributions
Several works [5–13] that profile IoT devices and their behaviors to detect security breaches
and/or monitor an IoT environment pose two limitations: (i) Collecting and interpreting data from
an IoT system is extremely challenging. Existing solutions [7, 8] either perform entropy analysis
of encrypted traffic or use only the unencrypted features of network traffic (e.g., TCP headers and
flow metadata). Due to its great reliance on data inference, false positives/negatives are a legitimate
concern. Providing better accuracy in these security solutions is a critical challenge. (ii) Such
approaches may reveal sensitive information (e.g., daily routines of smart home users [13]) about
an IoT system and its users, threatening their privacy. Preserving privacy while sharing sensitive
data for security analysis is another challenge.
We overcome these limitations and propose an approach to proactively extract IoT device ca-
pabilities from their vendor materials. Our work aims to provide a method for extracting IoT
capability information in unambiguous terms. Additionally, we propose how these capabilities can
be leveraged in an access control scheme that can provide users with fine-grained control over
policies that match these intuitive and innate IoT security goals. We first define the notion of de-
vice capability in the context of IoT. Second, we extract the transducer (i.e., sensor and actuator)
information for each device using vendor-provided specification and marketing materials. Third,
we identify the capabilities of a device using an ontology that we derive that encodes capabilities
of each sensor and actuator type. We discuss our approach in the context of smart homes, an im-
portant IoT domain with projections of 505 million active smart home devices worldwide by this
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year [14] and evaluate its efficiency and accuracy. Finally, we discuss the use of the capability
information we extract for the application of fine-grained access control.
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
• We propose a new approach to proactively extract the device capabilities from design speci-
fications. The key advantages of this approach over existing works are:
(i) This approach does not rely on environment data and is therefore not directly affected by
the difficulties of collecting and interpreting IoT data, and further is free from the privacy
concerns of data sharing; and
(ii) This approach enables proactive security verification of an IoT device even before it is
installed or deployed.
• We are the first to define this concept of device capability in IoT, which can potentially
be applied in the future security solutions for various IoT applications (e.g., smart grid,
autonomous vehicle, smart health, etc.) to offer proactive security guarantee.
• As a proof of concept, we apply our extraction approach in the context of smart homes. We
demonstrate the applicability of our approach by applying it to devices from various vendors
(e.g., Google, Ring, and Alro), and we evaluate it in terms of its efficiency and accuracy.
• We introduce a scheme for fine-grained, user-defined access control in an IoT ecosystem that
leverages the capability information that our extraction approach can provide.
1.5 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a background on the
vendor materials that are analyzed in this work as well as our assumptions and threat model. Chap-
ter 3 introduces our novel model of IoT device capabilities. Chapter 4 describes our methodology
for extracting capabilities from vendor materials. Chapter 5 provides details on the implementation
of our capability extraction methodology. Chapter 6 presents an evaluation of the implementation’s
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performance in terms of efficiency and accuracy. Chapter 7 presents discussions on different as-
pects our implemented methodology. Chapter 8 discusses how capabilities extracted through our
methodology can be leveraged in a fine-grained, user-defined access control scheme. Chapter 9
discusses related work and its limitations. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes this thesis and discusses




This chapter first provides a background on the vendor materials for IoT devices and then
identifies the challenges to extract the capabilities from those materials; these challenges will later
be addressed by our solution to extract capabilities from those vendor materials.
2.1 Vendor Materials
This section describes various vendor materials that provide the specification information of
IoT devices.
2.1.1 Vendor Material Description
We consider vendor materials including product webpages, technical specifications, and de-
veloper documentations which are publicly available online and contain specification details of a
device such as sensors, actuators, or related features.
Product Webpages. Product webpages are official marketing pages from which a consumer can
purchase an IoT product, and contain the summary information about the device. For instance,
Google has a page for each of its major Nest products (e.g., [15]). These pages can serve as an
initial and often cursory source of information about a smart home device and its specifications.
Technical Specifications. Technical specification pages provide details about a device in terms
of its hardware specifications. For instance, a technical specification page is available for each
major Google Nest product (e.g., [4]). This work considers technical specification pages as the
most significant sources of information about a device’s hardware components, as they most often
provide explicit enumerations of device components.
Developer Documentations. Developer documentations provide information to developers who
create applications for or in conjunction with smart home devices. These materials usually include
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standardized software interfaces accessible as RESTful services, or software packages that can
be integrated into other applications. Some vendors also offer entire platforms that can act as an
abstraction on which different products can interoperate. Even though these materials are intended
for application developers, they can be used as a source for the extraction of information about the
hardware and capabilities of a device.
2.1.2 Investigation on Real-World Vendor Materials
We analyze the contents of several vendor materials for seven different devices by leveraging
simple natural language processing techniques. These analyses result in insights on the challenges
that come with the extraction of capability information from vendor materials, which is illustrated
through the following examples.
Figure 2.1 shows the term frequency distribution for the Google Nest Cam Indoor’s vendor
materials as a word cloud, where the larger terms appear more frequently across the corpus of
materials. This particular corpus is constructed from the Nest Cam Indoor main product page,
technical specifications page, technical specifications support page, and the Nest Cam Developer
API documentation [4, 15–17]. The full corpus contains 4,175 words after pre-processing. The
word cloud suggests that terms that would intuitively be assumed to appear frequently, such as
“camera” and “nest” appear often, as these terms are directly related to the primary functionality
of the device. However, terms that are indicative of other transducers and their capabilities appear
less often, and even appear less often than terms that are unrelated or potentially indicative of
transducers that the device does not have. Figure 2.2 illustrates the frequency distribution of only
a subset of notable terms.
From this distribution, it can be seen that the term “microphone” appears less often than “tem-
perature,” despite the fact that the Nest Cam Indoor has no transducer related to temperature. This
particular disparity has to do with the “operation” and “storage” sections of the technical specifi-
cations page for the device, which can be seen in Figure 2.3. Other terms that are not related to any
9
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Freq. Dist. of Nest Cam Terms (Subset)
Transducer-relevant terms
Irrelevant terms
Figure 2.2: The term frequencies for a subset of terms from vendor materials on the Nest Cam Indoor.
Terms that are more directly related to the transducer they refer to appear in blue, while other terms appear
in red.
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Figure 2.3: Different sections of the Nest Cam Indoor technical specifications page [16], where the terms
“temperature” and “humidity” can be seen multiple times, but only in reference to the theoretical temperature
range in which the device can regularly operate and be stored.
transducer such as “power” appear far more often (41 times) than terms of greater relevance such
as “microphone,” “speaker,” or “audio” (each 7 times).
Additionally, term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) calculations are also per-
formed, treating each device’s corpus as an individual document, with the goal of determining
which unique words rank highly within each device’s collection of vendor materials and therefore
could be designated as most “relevant” to each device. An example of the results from this analy-
sis are visualized for two devices in Figure 2.4, which displays the TF-IDF scores for a number of
terms as well as the corresponding TF-IDF rank of each term within the vendor material collection
for the Nest Cam Indoor and the Arlo Ultra [18] smart cameras. Note that the TF-IDF scores that
are visualized in Figure 2.4 were computed using vendor materials for all seven devices that are
evaluated in this work, not only the vendor material collections of the devices depicted.
Transducers that are directly related to the primary functionality of a device are associated with
terms that tend to rank highly within the collection of that device’s vendor materials in terms of
TF-IDF. “Camera,” for example, is among the top-ranking terms for both the Nest Cam Indoor
























































































































TF-IDF Ranking of Various Terms
Arlo Ultra
Nest Cam
Figure 2.4: TF-IDF value and term rank within vendor material collections of the Arlo Ultra and Nest Cam
Indoor smart cameras, computed using all device corpora by treating each device’s vendor material corpus
as an individual document.
Protect’s vendor materials corpus. However, terms that are associated with other transducers that
are not directly related to a device’s primary functionality do not rank as highly. For both the
Nest Cam Indoor and the Arlo Ultra, the term “microphone” ranks 197th and 376th within each
respective device corpus, likely due to its low frequency of appearance within each corpus. The
same can be said for the corpus of the Nest Protect, where “microphone” ranks 270th among all
unique words.
Overall, TF-IDF fails to highlight many terms that are most indicative of a device’s transducers
and capabilities due to their infrequent appearances, and therefore is not a sufficient method to dis-
cover which transducers and capabilities are present on a device. While TF-IDF is well suited for
keyword extraction given an extensive corpus of written articles, there are a number of challenging
aspects of IoT device vendor materials that limit its use for our purposes.
2.1.3 Challenges in Extracting Capabilities from Vendor Materials
Based on the outcome of the analysis above, we enumerate the major challenges in extracting
capabilities from vendor materials as follows.
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No Standardized Template. Each vendor follows different templates for their materials and fur-
thermore, different materials of the same vendor follow different formats. There is no standard
template or specification for how to describe different generic features or hardware components of
IoT devices. This implies significant effort to extensively learn those different templates to extract
information from them comprehensively.
Brevity of the Materials. As vendor materials are usually meant for a consumer audience, they are
expressed in a brief manner and do not include all explicit specifications of a device. Therefore, ex-
tracting device information from them requires more interpretation of their contents. Additionally,
terms that are indicative of particular hardware components may only appear a limited number of
times within the materials, especially if they are not related to the primary function of the device.
Vendor-Specific Jargon. Each vendor tends to use their own set of terminologies when describing
their devices. As the primary purpose of vendor materials is to inform potential purchasers about
a device, vendors tend to craft language around what information they believe is the most useful
or well-received in the eyes of the consumer, and include terminology that may be unique to only
their line of products. For example, one feature of the Nest Protect is advertised on the overview
page as “Steam Check.” Accordingly, learning the vocabularies used for various vendors and then
normalizing them to infer their capabilities presents additional challenges.
Interpreting Visual Contents. Several contexts of vendor materials are represented visually and
are therefore difficult to detect automatically. An interesting aspect of the marketing and technical
specification pages for IoT devices is the way that page layout and structure provide contextual
information in the form of visual cues and hierarchical organization. In these cases, text processing
alone becomes insufficient for comprehensive extraction of transducer information. For example,
Figure 2.5 displays an example layout of technical specifications for multiple Google Nest cameras
[16]. Though this figure only shows a small portion of the page, it is clear that there is a great
amount of information carried in its layout.
Distribution of Information. Information about any one device is distributed over various mate-
rials. For the most thorough extraction of transducer and capability information, it is essential that
13
Figure 2.5: Use of page layout to convey information about different Nest camera devices [16]. Note that
the two columns of the table are labeled primarily by the images of each device.
as many different materials as can be found are utilized. However, different materials may or may
not be available, and some may be less accessible than others.
2.2 Threat Model
We focus on smart homes, a prominent domain of IoT, in this work. We assume that the
sensors and actuators in a smart home device may be used to conduct various security and privacy
attacks. Our approach, therefore, builds the device capabilities (i.e., the actions that a device
can perform) which can later be used to detect/prevent the adversaries that exploit these sensors
or actuators. Our approach does not consider the threats related to a malicious or vulnerable
transducer, which includes misbehavior and malfunction. Also, any network attack that does not
involve the transducers is beyond the scope of this thesis. In this work, we derive the device
capabilities from the vendor-provided materials that are publicly available. Therefore, any missing
information about a device in those materials may affect the effectiveness of our approach.
14
Chapter 3
A Capability Model for IoT Devices
The primary goal of this work is the automatic extraction and enumeration of device capa-
bilities from vendor-provided documentation materials. We present in this chapter a model that
captures device capabilities, as well as the transducers to which they are associated, as generics.
This representation allows us to consider transducers and their associated capabilities without any
dependencies on their actual implementations in hardware or software.
3.1 Definitions
This work defines a transducer as a sensor or actuator (inspired in part by the definitions in
NIST 8228 [19]). A sensor holds the core functionality of sensing or measuring various aspects
of a physical environment and converting such measurements to a digital signal. For example,
image sensors, motion sensors, and microphones sense light, motion, and sound from a physical
environment, respectively. An actuator converts a digital signal to some physical action(s), such
as emitting light, producing sound, or actuating a lock to toggle its state. Denoted formally, the set
of all transducers T is partitioned into the set of all sensors S and the set of all actuators A, where
T = S ∪ A and S ∩ A = ∅ (no sensor is also an actuator).
A device capability is a function that a device is able to perform. This work makes the assump-
tion that each transducer has associated with it a static set of capabilities that are intrinsically bound
to that transducer. In the case of the Nest Protect, a microphone is innately capable of capturing
audio, while a smoke sensor is innately capable of detecting smoke. A capability of a sensor is
denoted as csi and a capability of an actuator is denoted as caj . Note that, ∀i, j, csi 6= caj . However,
for any two sensors sm and sn, or any two actuators am and an, where m 6= n sm, sn ∈ S, and
am, an ∈ A, the set of capabilities may overlap.
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A transducer ti is either a sensor si or an actuator ai. Each sensor si and each actuator ai
are represented by a non-zero finite set of capabilities, denoted as si = {cs1, cs2, . . . , csp} and
ai = {ca1, ca2, . . . , caq}. Additionally note that si 6= {} and ai 6= {}.
An IoT device is defined as an embedded system that consists of a set of transducers. A
device Di consists of a set of sensors Si and actuators Ai where Si ⊆ S and Ai ⊆ A and
Si = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} and Ai = {a1, a2, . . . am}. The total number of transducers in Di is therefore
n+m.
As an example, the Nest Protect and a subset of its transducers could be represented in our
model as a device D1 with the following transducers: a smoke sensor s1, a microphone s2, a motion
sensor s3, and a speaker a1. The device D would therefore be represented as D1 = S1 ∪A1, where
S1 = {s1, s2, s3} and A1 = {a1}. Assume the capabilities of the smoke sensor s1 to be smoke
detection c1. Assume the capabilities of the microphone s2, motion sensor s3, and speaker a1
to be audio capture c2, motion detection c3, and produce audio c4, respectively. The full set of
capabilities this representation of the Nest Protect D1 would then be {c1, c2, c3, c4}.
3.2 Model Relationships
Transducers are represented in this work independent of their implementation details and fo-
cuses on their generic types, instead of transducer instances. As a result, devices and transducers
have a many-to-many relationship, where a particular transducer type can be associated with many
different devices, and devices can have a variety of transducers on board.
Consequently, multiple devices may have common sensors or actuators. For example, both the
Nest Protect and the Nest Cam Indoor have microphones. Two devices Dr and Ds shown below
have common sensor s3 and common actuator a2.
Dr = S1 ∪ A1 = {s1, s2, s3, a1, a2}; Ds = S2 ∪ A2 = {s3, s4, a2, a3}
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The set of capabilities for a device Di is computed as the union of the set of capabilities of
the transducers comprising the device. Multiple devices can share common capabilities by ei-
ther having a common generic transducer or by having multiple transducers that share a common
capability.
For example, the Nest Cam Indoor has an image sensor and therefore holds the capabilities
of image capture and light detection. On the other hand, the Nest Protect has an ambient light
sensor, which also holds the capability of light detection. This capability is shared between the
two devices, despite the fact that the transducers that the capability corresponds to are different. In
the formalization below, the two devices Dp and Dq have common capabilities cs3 and ca2:
Dp = {cs1, cs2, cs3, ca2, ca3}; Dq = {cs3, cs4, cs5, ca1, ca2}
17
Chapter 4
Extracting Capabilities from Vendor Materials
4.1 Normalizing Vendor Materials for Extraction
To prepare the vendor materials for building device capabilities, we first extract the device
specifications from the vendor materials, then remove irrelevant information (e.g., external navi-
gation links or copyright information) from those extracted specifications, and finally refine them
into a more homogeneous, and machine-friendly format.
4.1.1 Selective Extractions of Device Specifications
The initial extraction of the device specification is a process that operates on the input vendor
materials. The vendor materials must be parsed for their contents, which can be defined in terms
of semantics as well as more abstract information such as document structures and page layouts.
In our work, we assume the vendor materials are presented as HTML or text documents.
For HTML documents, we first remove the non-HTML contents from each web page, such
as style and script blocks. We then extract the raw text from the resulting HTML elements. The
information that is most pertinent to this work often only makes up a subset of a web page’s con-
tents. Other elements of the page including navigation links (to other products, for example) can
introduce terms that are unnecessary or that could even be misleading from the perspective of an
automated extraction system concerned with the device that is represented by the page. To over-
come this challenge, we parameterize this step so that specific sections of a page can be extracted.
For example, the technical specifications page for the Nest Protect contains page elements unre-
lated to the device’s hardware or functionalities, including navigation links to other products and
shipping information. With our parameterized method, we are able to extract only the specification
information for the device. We also tailor the parameters to specific vendor pages; these parameters
are often reusable, as web design within a single vendor is often homogeneous.
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4.1.2 Normalizing Material Content
To ensure that the contents extracted from the vendor materials are best suited for our trans-
ducer enumeration technique, our approach normalizes those contents by removing elements that
are not critical to the extraction process, including punctuation, non-alphanumeric, and non-white-
space characters, as well as “stop words” (i.e., common articles and prepositions in English). The
case and plurality of the resulting terms are also normalized through lemmatization, a process of
linguistics that simply involves homogenizing different inflections of the same term to its dictio-
nary form. The content output by the normalization step contains a more homogeneous sequence
of terms in the original order that they appeared in the vendor materials.
For example, the Nest Protect’s overview page contains the following text: “In addition to its
voice, Nest Protect uses colors to communicate. And we gave the new Nest Protect a brighter
light ring so it’s easier to see in an emergency and better at helping you see things in the dark”.
After the normalization step, the processed string will read “addition voice nest protect use color
communicate new nest protect bright light ring easy emergency good help thing dark”.
4.2 Building an Ontology
The inferences that must be taken into account to successfully interpret what transducers and
capabilities a device has often come with prerequisite technical knowledge that end consumers are
not expected to have. The same goes for a system that performs this interpretation automatically,
where an understanding of the language and structure of vendor materials must be encoded into the
process itself for the most accurate results. In other words, an ontology must be created and lever-
aged as the primary source of knowledge behind the enumeration of transducers and the mapping
to capabilities.
In this work, we develop an ontology that aims to provide an understanding of the terminologies
used to refer to specific components of a device, whether they are explicit, ambiguous, or uniquely
created and defined by the vendor. Additionally, we attempt to capture the general relationships
between abstract device types and their common transducers; for example, the abstract device type
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“smoke alarm” commonly has smoke sensor, carbon monoxide sensor, motion sensor, microphone,
temperature sensor, humidity sensor, light sensor, and speaker transducers.
It is worth noting that other characteristics of vendor materials could be encoded and utilized
for capability extraction. For example, because images of devices appear on product web pages,
an ontology could be created with an encoding of image-based knowledge that could equip the
system with an awareness of visual aspects of a device that provide hints of the presence of certain
transducers. An ideal system would be able to understand vendor materials to a capacity that is as
good or better than that of humans, including the ability to recognize transducers visually. Realis-
tically, an ontology of this nature can never be fully complete. An ontology can be continuously
augmented with new information to improve transducer enumeration; this new knowledge can be
found in a number of ways, including manual review of vendor materials or more automated solu-
tions that are outside the scope of this work. We create the initial ontology by manually reviewing
vendor materials in detail to capture the aspects described above.
4.2.1 Review of Vendor materials
The goal of the manual review step is to enumerate the different hardware components and
capabilities of a device for a baseline of ground truth, and also to enumerate and analyze the
inferences and assumptions that are required for the reader to draw these conclusions. These
results are captured and become the basis for the ontology that will be used as a parameter for the
automated enumeration process.
The process of manually reviewing vendor materials is the same for all devices. This process
involves reading through different documents that are associated with each device and interpreting
from them the set of transducers (and capabilities) of the device. During this process, any insights,
inferences, or context clues that are used in this interpretation are also captured. The most impor-
tant of these features are key terms that act as indicators of the presence of a particular transducer
or capability. A key term is defined in this work as one or more words that refer to a particular
concept.
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Table 4.1: Obtained ontology from the Nest Cam Indoor materials
Category Transducer Capabilities Example Terms
Sensors
Image Sensor Capture Image, Capture Video, Detect Light image sensor, camera, video
Microphone Capture Sound microphone, voice, audio
Actuators
Speaker Produce Sound Speaker, Audio, Two way audio
LED Light Produce Light LED light
Infrared Light Produce Infrared Light Infrared, IR, Night vision
For example, when reviewing the Nest Cam Indoor’s technical specifications on the Google
Nest support forums [16], simple terms such as “camera” are indicative of the presence of an
image sensor. On the other hand, the term “video” is more ambiguous, and could refer to the
video captured by the image sensor, or video displayed on some kind of screen. In this case, it
can be “inferred” that this term refers to an image sensor because of context clues provided by
additional related terms such as “1080p,” which refers to the resolution of the video captured by
the sensor, and “lens,” which refers to the lens of the camera. On their own, these additional terms
do not necessarily suggest the presence of an image sensor, but they can provide context when
considered in conjunction with other camera-related terms to suggest with higher confidence the
presence of the sensor. The understanding of these terms as context clues carries an assumed level
of prerequisite knowledge of camera-related terminology.
The visual cues provided by page structure can also help a reader understand the context around
the terms. For the Nest family of products, it is common for the term “temperature” to appear on
technical specification pages for devices that have no sensors or actuators related to the measure-
ment or alteration of any temperature. Instead, these instances of the term are used to describe the
“operating” constraints of the device (the theoretical range of temperature in which it can operate).
The only real indicator of this difference is in the table layout of the Nest Cam Indoor’s technical
specifications page, where a reader can see by way of the row’s label “operation” that the temper-
ature in this case refers to the device’s operating temperature and not any sensor. This part of the
page is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Perhaps the most abstract feature that is considered during manual review, which is largely
dependent on the individual reviewer, is the use of technical background knowledge to infer, from
a described concept, how a certain feature of a device may be implemented. The term “motion
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detection,” for example, could indicate the presence of a motion sensor or of software that enables
an image sensor to perform motion detection. Regardless, the ability for the reader to conceive of
these possibilities is dependent on their technical knowledge.
A sample enumeration of transducers and their capabilities for the Google Nest Cam Indoor
is summarized in Table 4.1. This table represents a portion of an ontology that is derived from
the manual review process. The ontology contains this enumeration of transducers and their cor-
responding capabilities, as well as some key terms that refer to the transducers. The ontology also
contains an understanding of which transducers are commonly part of different abstract device
types. In the case of a general smart camera, the transducers enumerated in Table 4.1 are common.
Note that our example of a motion-activated smart camera does not fit perfectly into the abstract
device type of a smart camera, due to the presence of a motion sensor. An additional abstract
device type could account for this extra sensor.
4.3 Extracting Device Capabilities
To enumerate device transducers using the above-mentioned ontology, we devise three algo-
rithms, namely, device cognizant key term set matching (dcKTSM), indicative key term set match-
ing (iKTSM), and all key term set matching (aKTSM), where a key term is a set of one or more
words related to a transducer. We further consider two types of key terms: indicative terms and
related terms. Indicative terms are considered to be unambiguously indicative of the presence of
a transducer. Related terms are related to a transducer, but may be more ambiguous, and hence
are not sufficient for drawing conclusions about its presence. For example, in the case of the Nest
Protect, the term “microphone” is considered indicative of a microphone, while the terms “audio”
or “voice” are considered related to a microphone.
The primary purpose of the proposed algorithms is to use different key terms found within
a corpus of normalized vendor materials text to determine which transducers are present. The
algorithms operate on a corpus of vendor materials that are assumed to be related to a single
device. They additionally use the ontology described in Section 4.2 as input to apply encoded
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knowledge for the extraction process. For our purposes, the ontology contains information about
terminologies used to describe devices, as well as details on the understanding of abstract device
types.
Using these inputs, the algorithms produce enumerations of transducers that can then be mapped
to their static set of capabilities (which are represented in the ontology). The transducers that are
enumerated from the extraction step must be represented in a standardized way, (e.g., using the
same identifier for the transducer type), where each extracted transducer is completely decoupled
from the device instance it was extracted from. This is to ensure that the transducers remain generic
and therefore fit into the model that is described in Chapter 3.
The main difference between the three algorithms is the broadness of their matching scope.
Device cognizant KTSM can be considered the most constrained, as it only matches with indicative
terms for a particular abstract device type. Indicative KTSM uses all indicative terms for matching,
without considering abstract device type, but does not use any related terms. Finally, all-KTSM
uses both indicative and related terms in the ontology, and therefore is most broad in matching
scope. While a broader matching scope may result in more device transducers being identified, it
may also introduce more incorrect matches of transducers from the ontology that are not actually
on the device. A less broad matching scope results in the inverse, where less transducers are
correctly identified and less incorrect matches of transducers that are not actually on the device.
For the example of the Nest Protect, consider the only indicative term of the microphone sensor
to be “microphone.” Assume the related terms for the microphone sensor include “voice,” “sound,”
and “listen.” It may be the case that the indicative term for this transducer never appears in the
corpus of vendor materials. In that case, the algorithms that are less broad in matching scope could
fail to enumerate that transducer. On the other hand, the other algorithms could enumerate the
transducer, but may also introduce incorrect matches if the related terms are also associated with
other transducers that are not actually on the device. We describe each algorithm below.
23
4.3.1 Device Cognizant Key Term Set Matching (dcKTSM)
The Device Cognizant Key Term Set Matching algorithm utilizes the ontology’s knowledge of
abstract device types to perform transducer enumerations. The ontology contains an understanding
of abstract device types and the transducers that are common to them. This knowledge can then
be leveraged in order to first estimate which abstract device type is represented by the corpus of
the vendor materials. From there, the indicative terms for that abstract device type are used to
determine which of its transducers are present.
Algorithm 1 shows the dcKTSM algorithm, which first filters the key term sets for different
generic device types, and then performs key term matching based on the most relevant set of
indicative terms. Specifically, Lines 1-11 outline the first matching step, which uses both indicative
and related terms to determine which abstract device type is most likely being represented by the
corpus of vendor materials. The indicative terms of the device type that is ranked as the best
match candidate are considered to be the terms that refer to the transducers of the device. A
reverse-mapping step is then performed on Line 12, where only these indicative terms are used to
determine which transducers are present. Note that the output of the first matching step is a subset
of indicative terms for the selected abstract device type. The reverse mapping step determines
which transducer each indicative term refers to, where some transducers may be referred to by
more than one indicative term. The final results contain an enumeration of transducer identifiers,
which are returned at Line 12.
The dcKTSM algorithm is able to better exploit context clues found in the related terms while
avoiding erroneous matches that can be introduced by their ambiguity. Additionally, the approach
accounts for the fact that terms that are most directly indicative of the presence of a transducer may
have a frequency that is much lower than that of other terms. For example, even if the indicative
term “microphone” appears only twice within an entire corpus, the presence of related terms such
as “audio” or “voice” can help bolster confidence when concluding that a microphone transducer
is present.
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Algorithm 1: Device Cognizant Key Term Set Matching (dcKTSM)
1 best_score← 0
2 best_matches← null
3 for d in Ontology[Devices] do
4 indicative_terms← d[transducers][indicative_terms]
5 related_terms← d[transducers][related_terms]
6 ind_matches← get_matches(indicative_terms, corpus)
7 rel_matches← get_matches(related_terms, corpus)
8 match_score← |rel_matches|+ |ind_matches|




4.3.2 Indicative and All Key Term Set Matching (iKTSM and aKTSM)
Algorithm 2 uses only the indicative terms without ranking term sets by potential abstract de-
vice type. Specifically, it evaluates the corpus for any matching indicative terms of any transducer,
and identifies the transducers through the same reverse-mapping process (as in Algorithm 1).





2 ind_matches← get_matches(all_indicative_terms, corpus)
3 transducer_identifiers← reverse_map(ind_matches)
Additionally, we consider a completely unguided KTSM alrogithm called all-KTSM (aKTSM),
shown in Algorithm 3, that performs the same matching as indicative KTSM, but also matches on
the related terms. In other words, this algorithm matches on all terms that are defined in the ontol-
ogy, regardless of whether they are related or indicative. Accordingly, we consider this algorithm
to be the most broad in matching scope and therefore least exact.
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3 all_terms← all_indicative_terms + all_related_terms
4 all_matches← get_matches(all_terms, corpus)
5 transducer_identifiers← reverse_map(all_matches)
Table 4.2: An excerpt of outputs from our approach.
Device Category Transducer Capabilities
Arlo Ultra [18]
Sensors
Image Sensor Capture image, Capture video, Detect light
Microphone Capture sound
Motion Sensor Detect motion
Actuators
Speaker Produce sound
LED Light Produce light
Infrared Light Produce IR light (enabling night vision)
Siren Produce high-volume siren
Nest Cam Indoor [4]
Sensors





LED Light Produce light
Infrared Light Produce IR light (enabling night vision)
Nest Protect 2nd Gen [2]
Sensors
Smoke Sensor Detect smoke
Carbon Monoxide Sensor Detect carbon monoxide
Temperature Sensor Measure temperature
Humidity Sensor Measure humidity, detect steam
Microphone Capture sound
Motion Sensor Detect motion
Light Sensor Detect light
Actuators
Speaker Produce sound
LED Light Produce light
Nest X Yale Lock [20]
Sensors
Light sensor Detect light
Touch Sensor Detect (capacitive) contact
Actuators
Lock Lock and unlock door
Speaker Produce sound
LED Light Produce light
4.3.3 Mapping to Device Capabilities
Capabilities of a device are enumerated from its constituent transducers. This work assumes
that transducers are associated with a static, finite set of capabilities that are established during
the creation of the ontology. Each transducer can be directly mapped to its set of capabilities as
per Chapter 3. The capabilities contained in the final output set represent a device’s functionality
unambiguously as it is described by the vendor materials. Table 4.2 provides examples of the




We build an ontology using the manual review process described in Section 4.2.1 from a variety
of vendor materials for seven smart home products: Arlo Ultra Camera [18], Nest Cam Indoor [15],
Nest Hello Doorbell [21], Nest Protect [2], Nest Learning Thermostat [22], Nest X Yale Lock [20],
and Ring Indoor Camera [23].
5.1 Pre-processing and Normalization
The pre-processing routine, implemented in Python, can fetch the product web pages directly
over the network via the requests library [24] by way of their URI, or read pages fetched previously
and saved locally. Pages are typically saved locally to ensure consistency between experiments,
and as a precaution against the contingency that web pages become unavailable.
To extract the textual content from those pages, we utilize the BeautifulSoup package [25],
which allows us to extract only specific sections of vendor material pages by providing parameters
with specific HTML tags and attributes used to identify page portions. Our current implementation
supports the static (HTML) elements in web pages, which is the current format for most vendor
materials. However, if some vendor materials only display their content dynamically, a simple
workaround would be to use a web engine to first internally render any dynamic content before
processing the resulting HTML. To normalize the text, a separate Python function replaces stop
words and non-alphanumeric characters via regular expressions. For the normalization of term
plurality, lemmatization is performed using the Spacy natural language processing package [26].
5.2 Extraction Algorithms
The KTSM algorithms described in Section 4.3 are also implemented as Python functions that
operate on a corpus from which to enumerate transducers. To encode the ontology created during
the manual review process (as described in Section 4.2.1), we use a JSON-based data model to
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represent abstract device types, transducers, their capabilities, and key term sets. Each transducer
is represented in the data model as having a static set of capabilities, a set of indicative terms,
and a set of related terms. Additionally, each transducer has a unique identifier. Abstract device
types are represented in the data model as collections of these transducer identifiers, allowing our
implementation to map from abstract device type to specific transducers and their term sets. These
data models act as additional parameters to our KTSM functions.
Given the corpus of a device’s vendor materials and the data model, the implemented KTSM
functions utilize the tree-based flashtext algorithm [27] to perform efficient key term matching.
This key term matching functionality does not support partial matches (as regular expressions do),
so distinct key terms must be used. It is also possible for key terms to overlap; for example, “image
sensor” and “image” are considered different key terms that have the same first token. For these
cases, flashtext counts the longest match, and does not count such terms more than once. In the
previous example, “image sensor” would be counted instead of “image.”
In the case of device cognizant KTSM, matches are extracted for indicative and related terms.
The total number of matches is first used to determine the best abstract device type, and the match-
ing indicative terms of the best candidate device type’s transducers are returned. In indicative
and all-KTSM, the matching step takes place with all indicative terms, and with all indicative and
related terms, respectively, and all resulting matches are returned. Matches are mapped to their





This section discusses the performance of our implemented solution, which is used to extract
enumerations of transducers for the seven devices.
6.1 Experimental Setting
All extractions are performed on a system with an Intel Core i7-8550U processor @ 1.80 GHz
and 8 GB of memory. We evaluate the performance of our implementation in terms of extraction
efficiency, accuracy of transducer enumeration, rate of incorrect transducer matches (false discov-
ery rate), and the overall precision and recall of each algorithm.
6.2 Efficiency
The goal of the first set of experiments is to measure the efficiency of our approach. The
efficiency of our implementation refers to the total time required to perform the pre-processing
step on the input vendor materials for a particular device. Displayed in Figure 6.1, the extraction
step is the most significant source of processing time in our methodology, ranging from less than a
second to nearly 20 seconds.
The time required for the extraction step depends on the size of the vendor materials that are
used as input. HTML files for devices may exhibit a large range of sizes; for example, pages on
Google Nest devices have the largest range of sizes on disk, from 38 KB to 2.6 MB. The HTML
extraction portion of the pre-processing step takes the largest amount of time, between 15 and
18 seconds, for the largest collections of web pages (over 4 MB total). Comparatively, smaller
collections of pages (totalling 200 KB or less) take less than a second for extraction. Figure 6.1
illustrates that extraction time scales with collection size linearly.
For most evaluated devices, the times required to perform the text normalization step, displayed
in Figure 6.2, are negligible when compared to those of the extraction step. Consistently, across
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Figure 6.1: Average text extraction time of the vendor materials for different devices by their size on disk,
computed over 5 trials.
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Figure 6.3: For each device, grouped by KTSM algorithm, the proportion of ground truth transducers that
are correctly enumerated.
all devices, the text normalization step is performed in less than a second, increasing slightly with
the total number of lemmas extracted.
The automatic enumeration of device transducers from normalized text has little impact on the
efficiency of our solution, due to the efficiency of the tree-based flashtext algorithm for keyword
extraction which we employ. We therefore don’t report the amount of time that the keyword
extraction takes. Additionally, the time required for mapping from enumerated transducers to their
capabilities is not included in our efficiency measurements, due to the fact that this mapping is
statically defined in the ontology. That is, once the transducers have been enumerated, establishing
their corresponding capabilities requires a trivial lookup in the ontology (implemented as a Python
dictionary, in our case).
6.3 Enumeration Accuracy
For the purposes of evaluation, a sample set of transducers for the evaluated devices are enu-
merated manually as ground truth. Enumeration accuracy is then computed as the true positive





































Nest Cam Indoor Term Proportions
Indicative Terms
Related Terms
Figure 6.4: A comparison of the proportions of indicative and related terms per document for the Nest Cam
Indoor [4].
approach. Figure 6.3 displays the results of our enumerations on the seven different devices from
three different vendors, grouped by enumeration algorithm.
Figure 6.3 shows that both the device cognizant and indicative KTSM algorithms provide sim-
ilar proportions of correctly identified transducers, averaging about 60% and 62%, respectively, of
ground truth transducers identified among all devices with a standard deviation of 24% and 27%,
respectively. In contrast, the all-KTSM approach averages an enumeration accuracy of 91%, with
a standard deviation of 16%.
For each extraction approach, there is a large disparity between the transducer enumeration
accuracy for the Nest Cam Indoor and the Nest X Yale Lock. We present a comparison of the
composition of the vendor material corpora for these two devices in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5,
showing the proportion of indicative and related terms for each document per device. Seen in these
figures, while not all documents in the Nest Cam Indoor corpus consist of a large proportion of
indicative terms, the entire corpus contains a higher proportion of indicative terms overall when

































Nest Yale Lock Term Proportions
Indicative Terms
Related Terms
Figure 6.5: A comparison of the proportions of indicative and related terms per document for the Nest X
Yale Lock [20].
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Figure 6.6: The proportion of corpus terms that are indicative correlated with transducer enumeration ac-
curacy of device cognizant KTSM.
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Figure 6.7: The proportion of corpus terms that are related correlated with transducer enumeration accuracy
of device cognizant KTSM.
An interesting property that follows from this comparison is the correlation between a corpus’
term class proportion and the enumeration accuracy for each device. Seen in Figure 6.6, as the
proportion of indicative terms grows larger, the overall enumeration accuracy of the dcKTSM
algorithm generally does as well. This is fairly intuitive, in that a set of vendor materials with a
larger number of terms that more explicitly reference a particular transducer will better inform of
the association of that transducer with the device. This means that a more refined ontology will
contribute to an increased number of indicative terms and improve the enumeration accuracy.
Similarly, Figure 6.7 displays the negative relationship between proportion of lemmas that are
related terms and the transducer enumeration accuracy. This relationship follows from that of
indicative term proportion and transducer enumeration accuracy, as a higher proportion of related
terms in a corpus is likely accompanied by a lower proportion of indicative terms in the corpus.
6.4 Proportion of Incorrect Transducer Matches
To evaluate the tendencies of our algorithms to incorrectly identify transducers, we also mea-







































Figure 6.8: For each device, grouped by KTSM algorithm, the proportion of matching transducers that are
incorrectly identified.
within the ground truth set. In other words, we measure the false discovery rates at which our
algorithms enumerate transducers that are contained in the ontology, but not actually associated
with the device.
Figure 6.8 shows the proportion of incorrect matches per device for each algorithm. The all-
KTSM approach suffers from the highest proportions of incorrect matches across all devices, with
an average of 36% of all transducer matches for each device. Indicative KTSM, on the other hand,
averages only 3% incorrect transducers, and device cognizant KTSM does not incorrectly attribute
any transducers to any of the evaluated devices.
The advantage that comes from applying device cognizant KTSM on texts extracted from ven-
dor materials is the fact that only the indicative terms that are associated with certain devices as
defined in the ontology are applied for matching. This ensures that only the most relevant terms
with the least ambiguity will be used to draw conclusions about the device’s transducers. If device
cognizant KTSM behaves in a way that is too restrictive and fails to enumerate transducers that
indicative or all-KTSM can enumerate, it may be the case that the term sets used for matching are
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not thorough enough, or a sign that the ontology’s representation of the device in question should
be improved.
6.5 Precision, Recall, and F1 Score
To better illustrate the trade-off between the enumeration accuracy and rate of incorrectly
matched transducers for each algorithm, we present the precision, recall, and F1 scores for our
approach, modeling the extraction as a binary classification problem in which an algorithm cor-
rectly predicts the presence of a transducer that is part of the ground truth set of each device. For
each algorithm, these composite scores are computed across all seven devices, meaning that the
discrete number of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and false negatives are computed
per-device before being summed across all devices.
Figure 6.9 displays a confusion matrix for each algorithm, which captures the enumerations
of all transducers for each of the 7 evaluated devices. Note that the ontology that is used for the
evaluation contains 16 total transducers, and that the number of true negatives is first computed
separately for each evaluated device before being summed. These confusion matrices therefore
represent the total numbers of correctly enumerated transducers, incorrectly enumerated transduc-
ers, transducers missed, and transducers that were correctly not enumerated for each algorithm.
We compute the precision, recall, and F1 score of each algorithm using the confusion matrices
in Figure 6.9. The F1 scores for the different algorithms are 0.761 for device cognizant KTSM,
0.757 for indicative KTSM, and 0.752 for all-KTSM. The more constrained algorithms, device
cognizant and indicative KTSM, exhibit high precision with 1.00 and 0.933, respectively. However,
the less-constrained alternative of all-KTSM suffers from a much lower precision of 0.631. At the
same time, aKTSM has a much higher recall of 0.932 compared to the recall values of dcKTSM
and iKTSM, which are 0.614 and 0.636, respectively. This indicates that the more constrained
algorithms more consistently enumerate transducers correctly, but more often fail to enumerate all
transducers.
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(a) Device cognizant KTSM confusion matrix












(b) Indicative KTSM confusion matrix













(c) All-KTSM confusion matrix
Figure 6.9: Discrete confusion matrices for each algorithm, computed for all ontology transducers across




7.1 Reliance on Vendor-Provided Materials
This work currently relies on the vendor-provided materials that are publicly available to derive
the device capabilities. Missing information in those materials may result in an incomplete list of
capabilities. To overcome this limitation, we intend to extend our approach to extract capabilities
from the software specifications (e.g., device configurations, firmware) in addition to hardware
specifications in the future.
7.2 Effects of Enumeration Accuracy
The obtained results on the enumeration accuracy of our solution in Section 6.3 indicate the
accuracy of our matching algorithms in automatically enumerating device transducers from vendor
materials. Some results clearly indicate that refinements to the ontology, and specifically the term
sets of different transducers, should be made. Our solution allows for such refinements to take
place iteratively, where an ontology can be augmented continuously with new vocabularies and
knowledge of transducer-device relationships.
In one respect, the similar F1 scores computed in Section 6.5 obfuscate the misclassification
tendencies of the different algorithms and therefore the true nature of the trade-off relationship that
exists between the algorithms. When considering the precision and recall of each algorithm, this
relationship is more clear, and suggests that the choice of which algorithm to use is dependent on
the goals of the user, organization, or application, as is the broadness of the transducer term sets. If
the goal is to ensure that only transducers that are truly present be enumerated, then a more focused
set of indicative terms should be used with device cognizant or indicative key term set matching.
On the other hand, if the goal is to ensure that as many transducers as possible are enumerated,
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then all key term set matching with a more extensive dictionary of indicative and related terms
should be used.
A point of interest going forward is to improve the transducer enumeration accuracy in an
automated fashion, using a learning-based feedback loop. This could involve the discovery of new
terms or alterations to the data model’s representation of abstract device types or transducers.
7.3 Adapting to Other IoT Domains
Even though this thesis elaborates on the context of a smart home, our solution can potentially
be adapted to other IoT domains (e.g., smart grid, smart health, autonomous vehicle). The main
adaptation efforts would be to learn the ontology of the vendor materials of the application-specific
devices and develop the extraction technique for those materials. The subsequent steps of our
approach would remain the same.
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Chapter 8
Applying Extracted Capabilities to Access Control
As our method produces a set of capabilities that are present on a device, a security or privacy
application could utilize these facts about devices as attributes of a policy-driven access control
system. In such a scheme, a user could define security policies that involve several attributes,
including device location, time of day, and device capability, provided by our solution. We briefly
explore in this section a model for such a system that is able to capture fine-grained security goals
as specified by users within a smart home or administrators within an industrial or business setting.
The proposed model is based off of NIST Next Generation Access Control (NGAC) [28] and
focuses on providing users with the ability to define policies that center around device capabilities
being allowed to be in certain areas of an environment. In NGAC, policy components fall into
hierarchical categories and are related to each other through relations, including associations for
granting privileges and prohibitions for denying privileges. In our model, we consider policy
components in terms of attributes of device capabilities which device instances can be associated
with, and location-based environmental attributes (i.e., where a device may be located with the
environment).
We consider a unary association for granting a single privilege, denoted Ci−{A}−Ei, which
indicates that capabilities that fall under the capability attribute group Ci are allowed within envi-
ronment locations that fall under the environmental group Ei. Similarly, we can explicitly specify
that capabilities within a capability group Ci are not to be allowed within an environmental group
Ei using a prohibition, which is denoted Ci −X − Ei.
Different environments or security goals require different default associations between capa-
bilities and environmental attributes. We propose two general possibilities:
• Exclusive “black-list” policies: Policies which, by default, allow all capabilities within all
environmental attributes. Users must explicitly specify exclusions to this default policy with
prohibitions.
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Figure 8.1: An example of an exclusive “black-list” access control policy, in which all device capability
groups are considered to be allowed in all environmental groups, except when they are explicitly prohibited.
• Inclusive “white-list” policies: Policies which, by default, prohibit all capabilities within all
environmental attributes. Users therefore must explicitly specify which capabilities should
be allowed in which environmental attribute groups via allow associations.
Consider the example of a policy that specifies that no device that is capable of image or video
capture should be allowed within private areas of a smart home, such as the bathroom and bedroom,
and that no device that is capable of audio capture should be allowed within a specific room that
is used for confidential meetings. Such a policy is modeled with our scheme and illustrated in
Figure 8.1.
This policy could potentially be violated by a smart mirror that provides an image sensor being
placed in the bathroom, or a smart smoke alarm such as the Nest Protect that includes a microphone
being placed in the meeting room. This particular policy example can be considered as a “black-
list” policy, where the default is to allow all capability groups within all environmental groups,
and prohibitions are used to deny specific capability groups from specific environmental groups
(including the entire smart home). The resulting policy is quite open, but not very complex and
therefore may be well suited for typical smart home users who need only define a few critical
exclusionary policies to ensure that their security goals are satisfied.
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Figure 8.2: An example of an inclusive “white-list” access control policy, in which no device capability
groups are considered to be allowed in all environmental groups, except when they are explicitly allowed
with associations.
On the other hand, users or administrators with more stringent security goals may prefer the
adoption of an inclusive “white-list” policy, which assumes that no capability group should be
allowed in any environmental group, unless explicitly included by way of an appropriate associ-
ation. Such a policy is illustrated in Figure 8.2, which specifies that devices with visual capture
capabilities should be allowed on the front porch and the meeting room, and that devices with
audio capture capabilities should be allowed in the meeting room as well. In this scheme, if a Nest
Cam Indoor IoT camera is placed in a private area such as the bedroom or bathroom, the policy
would be violated.
8.1 General Model
Generally, our policy scheme can be modeled as is illustrated in Figure 8.3. In this scheme,
any capability group can be white or black-listed through a relation to any environmental attribute
group. Depending on the policy, a device instance may be given its own relation to a specific envi-
ronmental attribute group in order to ensure that the specific device is allowed or denied privileges
within locations that fall under that environmental attribute group.
Capabilities enumerated with our extraction solution could be verified against user-defined se-
curity policies in this proposed model and therefore proactively affirm that users’ IoT security goals
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Figure 8.3: A general representation of the proposed access control model.
are satisfied. As discussed previously, many device vendors abstract away the actual functionali-
ties of their devices with the language and format of their related vendor materials. Our capability
model and extraction implementation can be applied to this proposed access control scheme to en-
sure that the security goals of users can be represented by policies that can be proactively verified
without any prerequisite knowledge from users.
8.2 Policy Conflict Resolution
Note that, as is the case with NGAC policies, policy conflicts can come about. For example, the
policy illustrated in Figure 8.1 specifies (from bottom to top), first that all capabilities are allowed
in all smart home locations. However, one step lower in the hierarchy (higher in the figure) specifies
that visual capture capabilities should not be permitted in private areas, which conflicts with the
more general relation.
For a smart home domain, a method of conflict resolution that is most appropriate is prioritizing
the more specific policy (in the previous example, the prohibition on visual capture capabilities).
This way, users can specify more broad security goals that can be refined with finer-grained re-
lations at the lower levels. There are alternative conflict resolution methods that could be better
suited to different security goals, such as prioritizing relations that specify a particular environmen-
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tal group. For example, ensuring that any relations that involve the “private areas” environmental
group are prioritized over any others that conflict.
8.3 Extension to other Attributes
Our proposed access control model focuses on location-based attributes of the environment.
However, this policy architecture could be well-suited for many other attributes of capabilities and
ecosystems, such as time of operation, roles of users invoking the particular capability, or history
of access or device behaviors. To achieve some of these more complex additions to the access




Research on IoT security has gained significant interest. These studies [5–12, 29–34] can be
considered in a few different categories, including device fingerprinting, application monitoring,
intrusion detection, and access control.
The existing device fingerprinting techniques [5–11] monitor and analyze the network traffic
of IoT devices. More specifically, [5, 6] automatically discover and profile device behaviors by
building machine learning models trained on network traffic according to their service (e.g., DNS,
HTTP) and the semantic behaviors of devices (e.g., detected motion), respectively. Similar analysis
is performed in Zhang et al. [7], where the fingerprints of a particular smart home devices are built
using their network traffic. Other works [8–11] use similar techniques to automatically determine
device identity or typical aggregate behaviors (as opposed to specific behaviors). Bezawada et
al. [8] utilize machine learning to build behavior profiles based on network traffic for devices
using the device category and device type. IoTSentinel [9], AuDI [10] and DeviceMien [11] use
unsupervised learning to build models for individual device types based on network traffic captured
during a device connection.
There exist several other security solutions (e.g., [31,33,35,36]) for smart homes. The existing
application monitoring techniques [35, 36] run on source code of IoT applications and analyze
these applications. More specifically, ContextIoT [35] and SmartAuth [36] offer permission-based
systems to monitor an individual app. ProvThings [12] builds provenance graphs using security-
critical APIs for IoT forensics. Soteria [37] and IoTGuard [33] verify security and safety policies
by performing static and dynamic code analysis, respectively. Zhang et al. [31] monitor isolation-
related properties among IoT devices through a virtual channel. Yang et al. [30] protect IoT devices
from remote attacks by obfuscating them behind onion gateways.
The existing works suffer from several limitations as follows.
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• Most of the solutions above rely on a great amount of inference, especially when considering
encrypted network traffic. Many solutions either perform entropy analysis of encrypted traf-
fic [8] or use only the features of network traffic that are not encrypted, such as TCP headers
and other packet and flow metadata [5–7, 9–11]. Because of this inference, false positives
and false negatives are a legitimate concern of these solutions.
• As most of the existing works rely on the application of inferential models (machine learn-
ing or otherwise), they are vulnerable to deceptive attacks, where an adversary may craft an
attack that conforms to the model’s expectation of legitimate traffic or behavior, thereby cir-
cumventing the model. On the other hand, an adversary could produce an attack that simply
performs a denial-of-service attack by, for example, inundating the system with purposefully
malicious traffic that does not conform to the model in order to overwhelm the model and
prevent the processing of any legitimate traffic.
• These solutions cannot detect/prevent the critical safety or privacy implications that are not
observable from the network traffic or application analyses, as they require access to either
network traffic when devices are in operation, or application sources. These observations
are also independent of other environmental attributes such as device location and therefore
may not fully encapsulate security goals of consumers.
• Additionally, these related works do not present a proactive solution. Works that build pro-
files of devices can only do so when devices are present in an IoT environment and their
traffic can be observed. Security solutions that analyze IoT applications for smart homes can
provide insights on security flaws that applications have before they are in use, but they also
require access to applications that may not be available.
This thesis, on the other hand, targets a different threat model where we extract an unambiguous
representation of IoT device capabilities from their vendor material that will facilitate evaluating
potential security threats even before a device is installed. These capabilities are generic and
are therefore independent of device implementation and vendor. Further, our capability model
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represents capabilities in a way that is more in line with the innate security goals and policies
of consumers. Our extraction methodology also does not require visibility of network traffic or





With the growing popularity of IoT, the necessity of ensuring its security continues becoming
more important than ever. To that end, existing works rely on observable data (e.g., network
traffic, sensor data, etc.) and therefore suffer from several security and potential privacy concerns.
We proposed an approach to enumerate IoT device capabilities from their related vendor-provided
materials in order to ensure that consumers or security applications acting on their behalf can be
proactively informed, in a clear and unambiguous way, of what a device is able to do.
More specifically, we introduced an IoT device capability model that can represent device
capabilities in an unambiguous way and used a manual review process to build an ontology that
encoded learned information about vendor-provided documentation materials. We implemented
and evaluated a novel set of algorithms that can be used to extract transducer information from
vendor materials and map that information to device capabilities. Additionally, we presented a
scheme for fine-grained and expressive user-defined attribute-based access control that leverages
the capability information that our extraction approach provides.
10.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions
Our current work relies only on vendor provided materials that are publicly available and may
be missing some information. In the future, we plan to augment our approach with information
from software specifications, device configurations, and additional materials extracted from device
firmware. Additionally, improvements to automate the building of the vendor material ontology
are an area of particular interest for future work, where new terms or other contextual items pro-
vided by materials could be discovered automatically. Our future work also includes adapting our
methodology to other IoT ecosystems including the smart grid, smart health, autonomous vehicles,
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and industrial IoT. We also leave the verification of our proposed access control scheme, as well as
additional extensions to it described in Section 8.3 as future work.
49
Bibliography
[1] Statista market forecast. Internet of Things (IoT) connected devices installed base worldwide
from 2015 to 2025, 2016.
[2] Nest Protect 2nd Gen - Installation and Tech Specs - Google Store. https://store.google.com/
us/product/nest_protect_2nd_gen_specs.
[3] Weijia He, Maximilian Golla, Roshni Padhi, Jordan Ofek, Markus Dürmuth, Earlence Fer-
nandes, and Blase Ur. Rethinking Access Control and Authentication for the Home Internet
of Things (IoT). In Proc. of USENIX, pages 255–272, Baltimore, MD, August 2018.
[4] Nest Cam Indoor - Installation and Tech Specs - Google Store. https://store.google.com/us/
product/nest_cam_specs.
[5] M. Lopez-Martin, B. Carro, A. Sanchez-Esguevillas, and J. Lloret. Network Traffic Classifier
With Convolutional and Recurrent Neural Networks for Internet of Things. IEEE Access,
5:18042–18050, 2017.
[6] T.J. OConnor, Reham Mohamed, Markus Miettinen, William Enck, Bradley Reaves, and
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. HomeSnitch: Behavior Transparency and Control for Smart Home
IoT Devices. In Proc. of WiSec, pages 128–138, 2019.
[7] Wei Zhang, Yan Meng, Yugeng Liu, Xiaokuan Zhang, Yinqian Zhang, and Haojin Zhu.
HoMonit: Monitoring Smart Home Apps from Encrypted Traffic. In Proc. of CCS, pages
1074–1088, 2018.
[8] Bruhadeshwar Bezawada, Maalvika Bachani, Jordan Peterson, Hossein Shirazi, Indrakshi
Ray, and Indrajit Ray. Behavioral Fingerprinting of IoT Devices. In Proc. of ASHES, pages
41–50, 2018.
50
[9] M. Miettinen, S. Marchal, I. Hafeez, N. Asokan, A. Sadeghi, and S. Tarkoma. IoT SEN-
TINEL: Automated Device-Type Identification for Security Enforcement in IoT. In Proc. of
ICDCS, pages 2177–2184, June 2017.
[10] S. Marchal, M. Miettinen, T. D. Nguyen, A. Sadeghi, and N. Asokan. AuDI: Toward Au-
tonomous IoT Device-Type Identification Using Periodic Communication. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, 37(6):1402–1412, June 2019.
[11] Jorge Ortiz, Catherine Crawford, and Franck Le. DeviceMien: Network Device Behavior
Modeling for Identifying Unknown IoT Devices. In Proc. of IoTDI, pages 106–117, Mon-
treal, Quebec, Canada, 2019.
[12] Qi Wang, Wajih Ul Hassan, Adam Bates, and Carl Gunter. Fear and Logging in the Internet
of Things. In NDSS, 2018.
[13] Simon Birnbach, Simon Eberz, and Ivan Martinovic. Peeves: Physical Event Verification in
Smart Homes. In Proceedings of CCS, pages 1455–1467. ACM, 2019.
[14] Statista market forecast. Smart home – United States.
https://www.statista.com/outlook/279/109/smart-home/united-states, 2019.
[15] Nest Cam Indoor - Home Security Camera - Google Store. https://store.google.com/us/
product/nest_cam.
[16] Technical specifications for Nest cameras and video doorbells - Google Nest Help. https:
//support.google.com/googlenest/answer/9259110.
[17] Camera API | Nest Developers. https://developers.nest.com/reference/api-camera.
[18] Arlo Ultra | HD Security Camera | Wireless Camera System. https://www.arlo.com/en-us/
products/arlo-ultra/default.aspx.
51
[19] V.K. Shen, D.W. Siderius, W.P. Krekelberg, and H.W. Hatch. Considerations for Managing
Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity and Privacy Risks. Technical report, National Institute
of Standards and Technology, June 2019.
[20] Nest x Yale Lock - Key-Free Smart Deadbolt - Google Store. https://store.google.com/us/
product/nest_x_yale_lock.
[21] Nest Hello Video Doorbell - Know Who’s Knocking - Google Store. https://store.google.
com/us/product/nest_hello_doorbell.
[22] Nest Learning Thermostat - Installation and Tech Specs - Google Store. https://store.google.
com/us/product/nest_learning_thermostat_3rd_gen_specs.
[23] Indoor Cam | Indoor Security Cameras | Ring. https://shop.ring.com/products/
mini-indoor-security-camera.
[24] Requests. Requests: HTTP for humans. https://requests.readthedocs.io/en/master/.
[25] beautifulsoup. beautifulsoup4 4.8.2. https://pypi.org/project/beautifulsoup4/.
[26] spaCy. spaCy: Industrial-strength natural language processing in python. https://spacy.io/.
[27] V. Singh. Replace or Retrieve Keywords In Documents at Scale. ArXiv e-prints, October
2017. Provided by the SAO/NASA Astrophysics Data System.
[28] David Ferraiolo, Ramaswamy Chandramouli, Rick Kuhn, and Vincent Hu. Extensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) and Next Generation Access Control (NGAC). In
Proceedings of ABAC, page 13–24, 2016.
[29] Jiwon Choi, Hayoung Jeoung, Jihun Kim, Youngjoo Ko, Wonup Jung, Hanjun Kim, and Jong
Kim. Detecting and identifying faulty IoT devices in smart home with context extraction. In
IEEE DSN, 2018.
52
[30] Lei Yang, Chris Seasholtz, Bo Luo, and Fengjun Li. Hide your hackable smart home from
remote attacks: The multipath onion IoT Gateways. In ESORICS, 2018.
[31] Yang Zhang and Jun-liang Chen. Modeling virtual channel to enforce runtime properties for
IoT services. In ICC, 2017.
[32] Smriti Bhatt, Farhan Patwa, and Ravi Sandhu. An access control framework for cloud-
enabled wearable Internet of Things. In CIC, 2017.
[33] Z. Berkay Celik, Gang Tan, and Patrick D McDaniel. IoTGuard: Dynamic Enforcement of
Security and Safety Policy in Commodity IoT. In NDSS, 2019.
[34] Martin Serror, Martin Henze, Sacha Hack, Marko Schuba, and Klaus Wehrle. Towards in-
network security for smart homes. In ARES, 2018.
[35] Yunhan Jack Jia, Qi Alfred Chen, Shiqi Wang, Amir Rahmati, Earlence Fernandes, Zhuo-
qing Morley Mao, Atul Prakash, and Shanghai JiaoTong Unviersity. ContexloT: Towards
Providing Contextual Integrity to Appified IoT Platforms. In NDSS, 2017.
[36] Yuan Tian, Nan Zhang, Yueh-Hsun Lin, XiaoFeng Wang, Blase Ur, Xianzheng Guo, and
Patrick Tague. SmartAuth: User-Centered Authorization for the Internet of Things. In
USENIX Security, 2017.
[37] Z. Berkay Celik, Patrick McDaniel, and Gang Tan. Soteria: Automated IoT Safety and
Security Analysis. In USENIX ATC, 2018.
53
